We analyze the relation between algorithmic trading and liquidity using a novel data set from the Austrian equity market. Our sample covers almost 4.5 years, it identifies the market share of algorithmic trading at the stock-day level, and it comes from a market that has hitherto not been analyzed. We address the endogeneity problem using an instrumental variables approach. Our results indicate that an increase in the market share of algorithmic trading causes a reduction in quoted and effective spreads while quoted depth and price impacts are unaffected. They are consistent with algorithmic traders on average acting as market makers. We analyze the relation between algorithmic trading and liquidity using a novel data set from the Austrian equity market. Our sample covers almost 4.5 years, it identifies the market share of algorithmic trading at the stock-day level, and it comes from a market that has hitherto not been analyzed. We address the endogeneity problem using an instrumental variables approach. Our results indicate that an increase in the market share of algorithmic trading causes a reduction in quoted and effective spreads while quoted depth and price impacts are unaffected. They are consistent with algorithmic traders on average acting as market makers.
Introduction
Trading in financial markets has seen a tremendous shift towards algorithmic trading (AT). Regulators are concerned about potential negative effects of AT on market quality and have taken action to limit its extent. The naked access ban imposed by the SEC (Chakrabarty et al., 2014) , the tax on high frequency trading imposed in Italy (Rühl and Stein, 2014) of these data sets only cover short sample periods (several months at most). 1 The present paper contributes to this literature in several ways. We use a novel data set from the Austrian stock market. It spans 52 months, a much longer sample period than most previous studies, and it allows for accurate identification of the market share of AT at the stock-day level. We provide out-of-sample evidence by analyzing a non-US market that has not previously been analyzed. The Austrian equity market has the additional advantage that the market share of the Vienna Stock Exchange has been rather stable throughout our sample period. This is in sharp contrast to incumbent exchanges in other countries which have suffered considerable declines in market shares over the same period.
While AT may affect market quality, it may also be true that market conditions affect the amount of AT, resulting in a potential endogeneity problem. We follow Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) and instrument the market share of AT in a stock on a day by the average AT market share of all other stocks on that day. Our results indicate that AT has a positive effect on liquidity. An increase in the share of algorithmic trading causes a reduction in quoted and effective spreads while it does not affect quoted depth. We also find that AT has no effect on the price impact, implying that AT do not predominantly trade on private information.
Taken together, our results do not provide support for regulatory activities to curb AT.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces data and preliminary results. Section 3 outlines methodology and presents empirical findings. Section 4 concludes the paper. 1 An exception is a data set from the National Stock Exchange in India. It is used in studies by Boehmer and Shankar (2014) and Aggarwal and Thomas (2014) and contains complete order book and trade information for several years as well as an AT flag that allows for accurate identification of AT trading.
-4 - 3 ) in trading ATX constituents stocks. Thus, our sample captures the bulk of trading in the sample stocks. Cross-market trading is thus less of an issue in the Austrian market than it is in most other developed markets.
Algorithmic trading data
Following a request from the Austrian Financial Market Authority the VSE required its members to identify their accounts as either AT or non-AT accounts from 2011 onwards.
When an account is declared "AT" all trading conducted via this account is classified as 2 In fact, the specialist position is assigned in a yearly tender procedure for each stock to the market maker who offers the best "package" of maximum spread and minimum depth restrictions. For details see Wiener Börse (2017) . 3 The data is taken from www.bats.com (accessed February 9, 2017) and relates to trading on regulated markets and multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) during our sample period. The corresponding values for the constituents of the German DAX traded on XETRA® and the UK FTSE100 constituents traded by LSE Group are 62% (standard deviation 4.5%) and 54% (standard deviation 3.4%), respectively.
-5 - were exempted from the reporting requirement. Their trading activity is thus not counted as AT. who report a 27.7% AT market share for their mid-sized stocks, a sample which is comparable in terms of market capitalization to ours). However, as noted above, trades by the specialists and market makers are not counted as AT in our sample. This figure was revealed to us in private conversation with market participants. We are not aware of any official statistic.
-6 -AT share. However, no clear upward or downward trend is apparent during our sample period. 
Data on market liquidity
We use trade and quote data obtained from the Vienna Stock Exchange to construct standard measures of liquidity. and effective spreads amount to 0.225% and 0.253%, respectively. The average 1-minute price impact is 0.102%, corresponding to slightly more than 80% of the effective half-spread.
The average depth at the inside quotes amounts to € 11,710. The figures provided for the 5 Data on bid and ask quotes is missing for May 14, 2014.
-7 -first and third quartile indicate that there are significant liquidity differences across the stocks in our sample. 
Methodology, results and discussion
We present our results in two steps. In the first step we report correlations and OLS estimates, thereby ignoring the endogeneity issue. In the second step we use an instrumental variables approach to explicitly address the endogeneity concern.
Ignoring endogeneity
We start by calculating time-series correlations between the AT share and our four liquidity measures for each stock and then consider the equally-weighted cross-sectional mean and median. Similar to Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) and Aggarwal and
Thomas (2014) we find the proportion of daily AT to be significantly negatively correlated with the relative quoted spread (mean -0.10; median -0.06), the relative effective spread (mean -0.16; median -0.14) and the relative 1-minute price impact (mean -0.11; median -0.10). The negative correlations imply that spreads and price impacts are lower on days with more algorithmic trading. The correlation between algorithmic trading and average Euro depth is also negative but is much smaller in magnitude (mean: -0,04; median: -0,03).
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We next estimate a fixed effects panel regression of the form (2015) and include return volatility (derived from 5-minute midpoint changes), log share turnover, log market capitalization, the inverse of the closing stock price, and the lagged market liquidity measure, −1 . All variables are at daily frequencies. Robust standard errors are calculated by clustering the data along both dimensions, stock and time.
As a robustness check we re-estimate the model after winsorizing the data at the 1% and 99% percentiles. The results are very similar to those discussed below and are therefore omitted. This table reports one-stage OLS estimates and t-statistics for a stock fixed effects panel regression model that for our sample of 20 stocks at the Vienna Stock Exchange relates the proportion of algorithmic trading (algo_volume_prop) and several control variables to market liquidity. Liquidity measures LIQ include relative quoted spread (RQS), relative effective spread (RES), relative 1-minute price impact (RPI 1min ) and average Euro depth (DEP). Standard errors are computed using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust covariance matrix estimator and are double-clustered by stock and time. Sample period: September 2011 to December 2015. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1% and 5% levels. Table 3 are fully consistent with those of the correlation analysis presented above. The coefficient of the AT share is negative and statistically significant in all four models, implying that higher AT share is associated with lower quoted and effective spreads, -10 -lower price impact but also lower depth. These results are consistent with algorithmic traders submitting small limit orders at competitive prices, thus contributing to lower spreads while also lowering depth.
Results in
The coefficients for the control variables are in line with expectations. All four market liquidity variables exhibit significant first-order serial correlation. An increase in volatility is associated with higher spreads, higher price impact and lower depth. Spreads are lower and depth is higher on days with higher turnover. Spreads and price impacts are decreasing in market capitalization. The inverse of the daily closing price is positively related to the spread and price impact measures, and negatively related to depth, implying that higher price levels are associated with higher liquidity.
Dealing with simultaneity
The fixed effects regression model in (1) assumes all explanatory variables to be exogenous. However, while the amount of AT may affect liquidity it may also be true that the activity level of algorithmic traders depends on market conditions in general, and on liquidity in particular. In this case, however, a standard fixed effects regression will yield inconsistent estimates.
We therefore adopt the methodology of Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) and use the contemporaneous average AT share of all stocks except stock (denoted ̅̅̅̅ _ , ) as an instrument for the AT share in stock on day . 6 To test whether the instrument is indeed correlated with the AT share of our sample stocks we regress the AT share of each stock on its instrument, ̅̅̅̅ _ , , and the other independent variables (except for −1 ). The coefficient on the instrument ̅̅̅̅ _ , is positive and statistically significant for all sample stocks. 6 In a robustness check, we use as instrument the average AT share of all other stocks in the same size tercile. The results are very similar to those presented in the text.
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We estimate the resulting model using panel 2SLS. We first regress the AT share , on the instrument ̅̅̅̅ _ , and on all exogenous variables , . The predicted values from this regression are then used as instruments in the second-stage liquidity regressions. The results are presented in Table 4 . Our previous finding that increased AT activity causes a reduction in quoted and effective spreads is confirmed. However, the magnitude of the coefficients is reduced. We no longer find that AT activity has a significant impact on quoted depth and price impact. The coefficients of the control variables are essentially unchanged. Our findings are consistent with algorithmic traders acting as market makers. Their activity decreases the bidask spread through a reduction in the non-information-related components of the spread. This finding is consistent with AT activity reducing rents earned by the suppliers of liquidity. 
Conclusion
We revisit the question of how algorithmic trading affects liquidity. Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. We use a data set in which the market share of -12 -algorithmic traders is identified through a classification of traders. It spans 52 months and is thus considerably longer than the data sets used in most previous studies. Our data comes from the Austrian stock market, a market that has hitherto not been investigated. We thus provide out-of-sample evidence. We address the endogeneity problem using an instrumental variables approach.
Our results indicate that an increase in the market share of algorithmic trading causes a reduction in quoted and effective spreads while quoted depth and price impacts (a measure of adverse selection costs) are unaffected. Our results do thus not justify regulatory approaches to curb algorithmic trading activity.
